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T he power to tax is taken for granted in a great deal of mainstream public finance. In considering limits to taxation, traditional research in the field focuses on limits imposed by incentive constraints, which are tied to asym-
metric information or to politics and political institutions. The limits to taxation 
are rarely tied to the administrative capacity of the state. But incentive constraints 
alone cannot explain the vast differences in the levels of taxation that we see 
across the world and across time. Low-income countries typically collect taxes of 
between 10 to 20 percent of GDP, while the average for high-income countries is 
more like 40 percent.
In essence, our view on these patterns is similar to that taken by Joseph 
Schumpeter (1918) almost a century ago, when he noted: “The fiscal history of a 
people is above all an essential part of its general history. An enormous influence 
on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the 
state necessitates, and from the use to which the results are put.” In order to under-
stand taxation, economic development, and the relationships between them, we 
need to think about the forces that drive the development process. Poor countries 
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are poor for certain reasons and these reasons can also help to explain their weak-
ness in raising tax revenue.
We begin by laying out some basic relationships regarding how tax revenue 
as a share of GDP varies with per capita income and with the breadth of a coun-
try’s tax base. We sketch a baseline model of what determines a country’s tax 
revenue as a share of GDP. Like many baseline models in economics, it is useful 
not because it applies very directly to the real world, but because it helps orga-
nize our thinking about what departures from the model are likely to be useful. 
We then turn to our primary focus: why do developing countries tax so little? We 
begin with factors related to the economic structure of these economies. But 
we argue that there is also an important role for political factors, such as weak 
institutions, fragmented polities, and a lack of transparency due to weak news 
media. Moreover, sociological and cultural factors—such as a weak sense of 
national identity and a poor norm for compliance—may stifle the collection 
of tax revenue. In each case, we suggest the need for a dynamic approach that 
encompasses the two-way interactions between these political, social, and cultural 
factors and the economy.
Of course the study of taxation in low-income countries teaches us about the 
general forces driving higher and lower levels of taxation, but it does much more. 
The evolution of taxing power is central not only to the state’s capacity to raise 
revenue, but also to its capacity to provide goods and services and to support a market 
economy. Moreover, political development goes hand in hand with economic devel-
opment, as citizens in participatory political systems demand sound management of 
increasing public resources. Thus, the power to tax is about much more than raising 
tax revenues—it is at the core of state development.1
Empirical Patterns
It is useful to begin the discussion with some broad facts in hand. Throughout 
the paper we will be considering taxation at the national level, not including state 
and local taxes. Figure  1 illustrates how the level and structure of taxation—
the share of tax revenue in aggregate income and the share of income taxes 
in revenue—has changed over the twentieth  century in a sample of 18  coun-
tries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, and the United States) drawing on data from Mitchell 
(2007). For 15 of these countries, the figure also illustrates the introduction of 
direct tax withholding of income taxes from pay, an important technical inno-
vation for raising income taxes by making use of firms in the collection of tax 
1 Discussions of taxation and development by noneconomists frequently emphasise this theme (for 
example, Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Levi 1988).
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revenues. The figure shades the years surrounding the two World Wars. These 
data illustrate the general tendency of government growth. The twentieth century 
has arguably witnessed the biggest increase in state power in history, at least in 
terms of the ability to raise tax revenues. A striking pattern shown in Figure 1 is 
the increase of taxation during each world war; also striking is that the share of 
countries with direct withholding of income taxes doubled during World War II. 
The importance of war in building fiscal capacity has long been recognized in 
fiscal sociology and is particularly associated with the work of Hintze (1906) and 
Tilly (1990).
Figure 2 provides a further window on the link between tax shares and GDP 
per  capita. It plots the total tax take as a share of GDP (from Baunsgaard and 
Keen 2005) against the log of GDP per capita (from the Penn World Tables), both 
measured around the year 2000. Different markers distinguish observations by 
income level, dividing countries into three equal-sized groups. Clearly, tax shares 
Figure 1 
Evolution of Tax Revenue, Income Tax, and Tax Withholding in a Sample of 
18 Countries
Source: Draws on data from Mitchell (2007).
Notes: Figure 1 illustrates how the level and structure of taxation—the share of tax revenue in aggregate 
income and the share of income taxes in revenue—has changed over the twentieth century in a sample 
of 18 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The sample represents a set of countries where we can reasonably assume that our measures are 
comparable across countries and time. We show unweighted averages across these 18 countries. For the 
data series that includes tax withholding, data for Finland, New Zealand, and Norway are missing. The 
periods of the two World Wars are shaded.  We consider only taxation at the national level, not including 
state and local taxes.
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are positively correlated with income. The outliers visible in the lower right corner 
of Figure 2 are the three oil states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman.
Figure  3 looks at the same relationship over time for the same sample of 
18 countries as in Figure 1, plotting five-year averages of the tax share over the twen-
tieth century (taken from Mitchell 2007) against national income (from Maddison 
2001). Here, the different observations are distinguished by time period. The 
cross-section and time-series patterns are strikingly similar. Higher-income coun-
tries today raise much higher taxes than poorer countries and the tax share in GDP 
of today’s developing countries looks very similar to what it did a century ago in the 
now-developed economies of the world.
Figures 1 and 3 illustrate paths of fiscal history that help shed light on today’s 
pool of countries in Figure 2. Much has been written on the tendency of govern-
ment to grow over time, and indeed few countries have reached a high level of 
prosperity alongside a low-tax state. While the United States and Switzerland do 
have somewhat lower levels of taxation compared to other high-income countries, 
they have much higher levels of taxation compared to developing countries and 
Figure 2 
Country-level Taxes and Income
Notes and Sources: Figure 2 plots the total tax take as a share of GDP (from Baunsgaard and Keen 2005) 
against the log of GDP per capita (from the Penn World Tables), both measured around the year 2000. 
The outliers visible in the lower right corner are the three oil states of Bahrein, Kuwait, and Oman.
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have followed a familiar path over time, with expanding powers of the state and its 
capacity to tax. We will argue that this path offers important lessons about economic 
development in general and the growing capacities of the state both to support 
markets and to provide nonmarket goods. The gist of this argument is not that 
having a large state—one that spends one-third or more of income on behalf of 
its citizens—is necessarily a good thing. But we will argue that creating institutions 
that can support and sustain markets with their attendant benefits for citizens also 
fosters incentives for high levels of taxation. In essence, the high-tax state is part and 
parcel of development.
We also see structural differences in the form of taxation. Trade taxes and 
income taxes represent two polar cases in terms of required administrative capa-
bility. Collecting trade taxes requires only observing trade flows at borders, while 
collecting income taxes requires a much more elaborate system of monitoring, 
enforcement, and compliance. One way to illustrate this difference is to look at the 
shares of revenue coming from trade and income taxes whatever the level of taxation. 
Figure 3 
Global-level Taxes and Income in a Sample of 18 Countries and 20 Time Periods
Notes and Sources: For the same sample of 18 countries as in Figure 1, Figure 3 plots five-year averages 
of the tax share over the twentieth century (taken from Mitchell 2007) against national income (from 
Maddison 2001). Here, the different observations are distinguished by time period.
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Such shares are plotted in the next two figures: in the cross-section for the year 2000 
(Figure 4) and in the time series throughout the twentieth century (Figure 5). (Data 
sources are the same as for Figures 2 and 3.) In both figures, we plot the income-tax 
share on the vertical axis and the trade-tax share on the horizontal axis. In the cross 
section as well as the time series, we find a clear negative correlation between the 
two tax bases and a clear correlation with income. High-income countries depend 
more on income taxes and many of them do not use trade taxes at all (witness the 
multiple X’s at zero trade taxes). On the other hand, middle-income countries and, 
especially, low-income countries use trade taxes much more. That said, we also see 
quite a bit of heterogeneity unrelated to income. Figure 5 illustrates how the move 
from trade taxes to income taxes is a clear feature of the historical development 
of taxation. As we found when comparing Figures 2 and 3, the cross-sectional and 
time-series patterns in Figures 4 and 5 are strikingly similar.
Figure 6 uses an alternate method to illustrate how low-income countries typi-
cally have different and narrower tax bases than high-income countries: it plots 
top statutory income-tax rates in the 1990s for a 67-country sample (from Gordon 
and Lee 2005) against the share of income taxes in GDP (from Baunsgaard and 
Figure 4  
Income Taxes versus Trade Taxes, for Countries with Different Levels of Income
Sources: Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) and the Penn World Tables.
Note: Figure 4 plots the share of income taxes in GDP on the y-axis versus the share of trade taxes in GDP 
on the x-axis (as of 1999) for countries that were high-, middle-, or low-income in 2000.
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Keen 2005). The top statutory rate (on the vertical axis) is roughly the same across 
different groups of countries, suggesting that the different tax take (on the hori-
zontal axis) is due to the tax base. The figure suggests that broadening the tax base, 
rather than changing the tax rates, would be the key to increasing tax revenues in 
many low-income countries.
These broad-brush data comparisons display some useful common patterns, 
but they also show a great deal of heterogeneity, which suggests that country-specific 
factors play a major a role. We will unpack both commonality and heterogeneity in 
the discussion to follow. To tee up that discussion, we point out a few further empir-
ical regularities that emerge from regressions on the cross-sectional data. These 
regressions are useful for description, but largely meaningless for making causal 
statements. One reason is the clustering problem—that is, countries that “do well” 
on one indicator also tend to well on many others. Another is that variables, which 
may be thought of as “controls,” are jointly determined with the outcome of interest. 
Figure 5  
Global Shares of Income Taxes versus Trade Taxes, in a Sample of 18 Countries 
and 20 Time Periods
Source: Data sources are the same as for Figures 2 and 3.
Note: For the 18 countries of Figure 1, this figure plots the global shares of income taxes in world income 
on the y-axis versus the  global shares of trade taxes on the x-axis (as of 1999) for five-year averages.
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Still, looking at the data is a useful start and provides some pointers that can be used 
to shape thinking about causal mechanisms.
In Table 1, the dependent variable is the share of taxation in GDP. Column 1 
reproduces the core finding of Figure  2, albeit in a different way. It shows that 
countries in the top  third of the global income distribution on average have a 
13  percentage-point higher share of taxes in GDP than countries in the middle 
third of global income distribution, and about 17.5  percentage-point higher tax 
take than low-income countries.
In column 2, we look at one historical and one social-cultural variable. The 
historical variable is the proportion of years in which a country has been in a war 
during its existence (defined by the start of the Correlates of War database or the 
country’s date of independence). We see a positive correlation between past wars 
and taxation. The social-cultural variable is ethnic fractionalization from Fearon 
(2003). More fractionalization is associated with a lower tax take.
Column 3 illustrates the correlation with a commonly used indicator of political 
institutions, namely the strength of Executive Constraints (constraints on the power 
Figure 6 
Maximum Statutory Income Tax Rate and Share of Taxes in GDP, for Countries 
with Different Levels of Income
Note and Sources: Figure 6 plots top statutory income-tax rates in the 1990s for a 67-country sample (from 
Gordon and Lee 2005) against the share of income taxes in GDP in 1999 (from Baunsgaard and Keen 
2005) for high-, middle-, and low-income countries.
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of the executive, as measured in the Polity IV database). When we measure Executive 
Constraints as the average historical value in the time period since the country 
entered the database (or since independence), we see a strong positive correlation 
with the share of taxes.
Column 4 explores two measures of state effectiveness: Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in which a low number means high perceived 
corruption and a high number means low perceived corruption; and the protec-
tion of property rights as measured in the International Country Risk Guide. Both 
measures are positively correlated with tax revenue, which is suggestive of there 
being some common determinants of state effectiveness.
Table 1 
Descriptive Regressions for the Dependent Variable “Share of Taxes in GDP”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variable:
 High Income 0.130*** −0.003
(0.024) (0.041)
 Low Income −.045***   0.036   
(0.013) (0.024)
 Average Years in War  0.417***   0.119
(0.104) (0.124)
 Ethnic Fractionalization −0.155***   −0.044
(0.042) (0.037)
 Executive Constraints 0.214***   0.079**
(0.030) (0.038)
 Corruption Index  0.055*** 0.038*
  (0 bad; 10 good) (0.018) (0.020)
 Property Rights Protection 0.214*  0.273*** 
(0.125) (0.099)
R2 0.405 0.278 0.324 0.575 0.644
Number of countries 123 101 105 91 86
Notes and Sources: The dependent variable is the share of taxes in GDP from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). 
High Income is a dummy equal to one if a country is in the top third of income per capita in 2000 and Low 
Income is a dummy equal to one if a country is in the bottom third. Average years in war is the fraction 
of years in external war from 1816 (or independence if later) until 2000, using two binary measures of 
interstate war and extrastate war from the Correlates of War (COW) database. Ethnic Fractionalization is 
taken from Fearon (2003). Executive Constraints measures the average value of the variable xconst from 
1800 (or independence date if later) up to 2000 from the Polity IV database. The average is taken over 
nonmissing values of xconst (values outside [1, 7] are treated as missing), and the resulting variable is 
normalized so that each country’s scores lie between 0 and 1. Corruption Index is the normalized value 
of the overall score of each country in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 
(with 0 indicating high perceived corruption and 10 indicating low perceived corruption), divided by 
its standard deviation. Property Rights Protection is measured by the International Country Risk Guide 
seven-point scale in 1997.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Finally, in column 5, we include all these variables at the same time. Now, the 
per capita income variables are insignificant, while the correlations with executive 
constraints and property rights protection remain strong. Of course, this does not 
give the stronger correlations any special status in explaining the patterns in the 
data, and even the conditional income correlations do not rule out concerns about 
reverse causality and joint determination of key variables. Making sense of these 
findings requires a discussion of economic and political mechanisms leading to 
two-way interactions among the variables at hand.
A Benchmark Model
To think about why taxation is so low in developing countries, we begin from a 
simple benchmark. Suppose that policy making is controlled by a group of citizens. 
This incumbent group has access to a set of tax instruments for raising revenue that 
can be spent on transfer programs and/or goods and services. Then, we expect 
taxes to be raised to the point where the marginal benefit to the ruling group of 
raising more tax for higher government expenditures is equal to the marginal cost 
of raising more tax, which depends on the elasticity of the tax base. This elasticity 
can include standard considerations of deadweight loss, as well as leakage from tax 
avoidance and evasion.
The best-known workhorse model in this spirit is probably the one laid out in 
the seminal paper by Meltzer and Richards (1981; see also the preceding papers by 
Romer 1975 and Roberts 1977). These authors assume a redistributive motive for 
raising taxation—the only tax base is income, with no avoidance/evasion margin—
and a median voter in control of policy. In this case, the marginal benefit of taxation 
depends upon the difference between mean income, which determines how much 
revenue goes up with the tax, and median income, which determines the rate at 
which the pivotal group of voters lose earnings when the tax is raised. The marginal 
cost depends upon the aggregate labor-supply elasticity, which is the only source of 
deadweight loss. In this setting, countries with greater inequality (defined by the 
distance of median to mean income) will tax more.
One useful purpose of a benchmark model is to clarify what specific assump-
tions imply a certain result and so help organize thinking about whether those 
assumptions actually apply or need to be modified. For example, it is highly 
debatable whether this benchmark model is a useful starting point for thinking 
about the size of government in the United States. With median household 
income around $50,000 and mean income around $70,000, a model driven by 
taxation-for-redistribution and a median voter suggests that US tax revenue 
should be one of the highest relative to GDP among the high-income countries, 
rather than one of the smallest. Thus, while the redistributive motive for taxa-
tion might still matter, it seems that a more sophisticated approach is needed for 
understanding the effects of this motive.
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Applied to developing countries, the central assumptions of the Meltzer and 
Richards (1981) framework appear even more problematic. First, policy making may 
not reflect the interest of a median voter, not least because many low-income coun-
tries do not have democratic institutions. Second, characterizing the redistributive 
motive as transferring resources away from the rich towards the poor and middle 
class may not do justice to the redistributive politics of many developing countries; for 
example, transfers may instead be directed at key political constituencies, who often 
are not at the lowest income levels. Third, leaving out nonredistributive motives for 
taxation—especially priorities for building infrastructure and spending on education, 
health care, and social security—may distort the picture. Fourth, as noted earlier, 
the income-tax base is relatively less important than in developed countries. Fifth, the 
margin of activity for tax avoidance and evasion are key factors for developing coun-
tries. In the following sections, we show how consideration of these five issues provides 
a way of understanding why taxation is so low in developing countries.
The motive for holding power extends far beyond the ability to determine 
taxes. Moreover, in situations where the ruling group is less constrained by checks 
and balances, the range of ways it may enrich itself or its cronies can be vast. Indeed, 
the type of politics conducted in advanced countries based on tax-funded redistribu-
tive programs are much less destructive than the forms of government intervention 
that are typical in low-tax environments. The fact that protection of property rights 
is positively correlated with taxation, and the level of corruption is negatively corre-
lated with taxation, is indicative of this. The genius of fiscal redistribution is the way 
in which it encourages a relatively open process where the rule of law is imposed 
and policies do not apply selectively or arbitrarily.
Finally, the Meltzer and Richards (1981) framework is inherently static, 
taking as given the structure of taxation and the level of economic development. 
Schumpeter’s (1918) view of taxation, mentioned at the start, instead emphasizes 
how the nature of taxation is embedded in—and interacting with—economic, polit-
ical, and cultural institutions. We turn next to a discussion of these institutions.
Economic Structure
Low-income countries typically have a large informal sector and many small-scale 
firms. They are also more likely to be dependent on a few natural resources or 
commodities and to receive foreign aid. This constellation of factors often pushes 
low-income countries toward a lower level of tax collections and a narrower tax base.
Informal and Small-Scale Firms
The large informal sectors in poor economies are inherently hard to tax 
(La Porta and Shleifer 2014, in this journal, discuss the desire to avoid taxes as 
an important motive for informality). Consider the preponderance of small-scale 
informal firms, such as street vendors or village shops, found through the 
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developing world. The incomes of these informal firms and their owners are 
hard to measure for tax purposes, and taxing their transactions is largely impos-
sible in the absence of formal record keeping. Across countries, the size of the 
informal sector is strongly negatively related to income taxation. This is illustrated 
in Figure 7, which plots the size of the informal economy (from Schneider 2002) 
against the share of income taxes in total tax revenue (from Baunsgaard and Keen 
2005), both variables from around the year 2000, for about 75 countries that appear 
in both data sources.
Having a large informal sector makes broad-based taxation of income next to 
impossible. It may also mean that the elasticity of taxable income with regard to the 
level of taxes is much higher than otherwise—that is, when the government of a 
country with a large informal sector tries to raise taxes, the taxable income reported 
to the government may drop substantially.
Thus, an increase in formality is a key part of the process by which taxation 
increases with development. While the relative size of the informal sector tends 
to shrink as an economy grows, economic growth may not automatically map into 
greater formality because government action plays a large part in the process. The 
Figure 7 
Share of Income Taxes in Tax Revenue versus Size of Informal Economy
Note and Sources: Figure 7 plots the size of the informal economy (from Schneider 2002) against the share 
of income taxes in total tax revenue (from Baunsgaard and Keen 2005), both variables from around the 
year 2000, for about 75 countries that appear in both data sources.
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gradual construction of a functioning legal system makes it more attractive for firms 
to operate in the daylight of the formal economy, and if they wish utilize the benefits 
of the formal legal system, they cannot also remain invisible for tax purposes. In 
addition, the creation of credit and land registries to improve property-rights and 
contract enforcement may bring economic activity into the purview of tax authori-
ties. This is particularly clear in the case of cadastral surveys (showing ownership 
and value of land), which typically began with tax purposes in mind. For example, 
the modern Swedish cadastral survey goes back to 1530, when it was introduced by 
King Gustav Vasa for the purposes of taxation. Scott (1998) emphasizes the impor-
tance of mapping land ownership in the history of European taxation.
 Informal firms tend to be small: it is hard to take advantage of scale economies, 
to export and become multiplant—or eventually multinational—without relying 
on the formal legal system. Formal firms can be the basis for raising tax revenue 
because these firms operate on formal financial markets—they have bank accounts 
or outside investors who demand transparent accounting—and because tax authori-
ties can use them to collect taxes from employees through income withholding. As 
Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) emphasize, income withholding also facilitates 
cross-checking of tax records between individuals and firms.
Aid and Resource Dependence
In the standard framework for tax determination, the government is solely 
responsible for financing of its spending needs. Another reason why the tax take 
is low in poor countries is that many countries receive significant aid flows, which 
are a significant fraction of GDP and often larger than domestically generated tax 
revenues. Moreover aid flows to the poorest countries of the world are large. For 
example, according to the World Development Indicators, the average share of aid 
in gross national income in a sample of low-income countries from 1962 to 2006 was 
around 10 percent. Availability of aid diminishes the incentive to take actions that 
would increase the domestic revenue base.
This argument is strengthened further in countries with endowments of 
easy-to-tax natural resources where taxation can use royalty payments. Around 
a quarter of the same sample of low-income countries (as defined in the figures 
above) have, in 2000, a share of petroleum exports that is more than 20 percent of 
GDP. The share of countries with economies heavily dependent on primary prod-
ucts is greater still.
Taxes from broad-based sources such as the value-added tax and income taxes 
will be lower where there is a greater access to other forms of revenue. In support 
of this idea, Jensen (2011) finds that a 1 percent increase in the share of natural 
resource rents in total government income is associated with a 1.4 percent lower 
share of taxation in GDP. While we do not know of research that convincingly 
demonstrates this conclusion, it is entirely possible that high foreign aid inflows 
and abundant natural resources have similar consequences, reducing the incentive 
to generate taxation from domestic sources. As an integral part of IMF stabilization 
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programs, the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department actively encourages governments to 
invest in legal and record-keeping steps that can help to build fiscal capacity. If aid 
dependence does indeed reduce domestically generated taxation, then the actions 
of the IMF could be viewed as second-best policy that counters some of the negative 
consequences of its aid.
Failure to Take Government Action
Taken together, these economic factors suggest reasons why poor countries 
have a smaller share of revenue in GDP: the combination of an informal economic 
structure, income from natural resources or specific commodities, and the avail-
ability of aid (for some countries) pushes many low-income countries into a situation 
of a low tax/GDP ratio levied on a narrow tax base and a narrow set of individuals. 
As economies grow, governments face the political challenge of restructuring and 
expanding tax bases.
Even though economic growth is important in widening the tax net and 
increasing the tax base, it does not mechanically translate into a higher tax take. 
For example, Piketty and Qian (2009) argue that increasing exemptions have 
led income-tax revenues in India to stagnate at around 0.5 percent of GDP since 
1986. Widening the scope of taxation to broad bases, like income and value added, 
require conscious decisions to collect revenues and to modify the tax system to 
reflect developments in the wider economy. In China, tax revenues—especially at 
the central level of government—declined between 1978 and 1994, because govern-
ment revenues had been dependent on funds generated in the state-owned sector, 
which was shrinking in relative size. However, China’s tax revenues then increased 
since the major tax reform in 1994 (for example, World Bank 2012, Ch. 3). 
To take advantage of growth and economic development requires the govern-
ment to invest in improvements in the tax system. Figure 1 gave an example of a 
major fiscal innovation, the introduction of withholding of taxes from pay. This step 
requires a change a government policy along with a determination to ensure compli-
ance. Without such measures, income-tax revenues may not increase significantly 
with development. Increasing the breadth of the sales-tax base or even introducing 
a value-added tax to widen the tax base also require direct policy change and are not 
an automatic by-product of economic growth.
That being said, structural change and the greater use of formal markets and 
formal firms reduce the costs of making such investments. Economic develop-
ment yields a prospective tax-revenue dividend, as more economic activity becomes 
taxable in practical terms. But whether this change will actually generate more tax 
revenue also depends on government decisions. These decisions reflect the political 
institutions in place, to which we turn next.
Some structural change can also lead to losses of government revenues. Govern-
ments that try to control inflation lose access to seigniorage. Attempts to deregulate 
or privatize the economy may also lower implicit taxes that were previously avail-
able to the government, especially if the determination of wages and prices are 
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liberalized. This has been a particular issue for countries that are moving away from 
socialist towards market economies. Thus, China has yet to move towards a modern 
tax system using sales and to stop using the leasing of land as a means of raising state 
revenue. When transitions are accompanied by economic growth, such issues can 
be masked for some time. Ultimately, however, conscious reform is needed to build 
an effective tax system.
Political Institutions
On the surface, it seems obvious that low-income countries have much larger 
needs than high-income countries for investments in infrastructure and basic public 
goods and services. Indeed, the international aid movement since World War  II 
is premised on this belief. Moreover, the World Bank and regional development 
banks exist in large measure to provide resources to developing countries to invest 
in public programs. As a corollary, the motive for raising tax revenues to fund basic 
services should, in theory at least, be extremely powerful in developing countries.
But whether revenues raised are channeled towards the highest needs depends 
upon the political equilibrium. In turn, this depends on how the political institu-
tions in place determine the identity of the ruling group that decides on policy 
and the constraints faced by rulers once power has been acquired. The question of 
who has political control directly affects decisions about the level and type of taxa-
tion, and is based on political costs and benefits as perceived by incumbent groups. 
Additionally, politics influences how the proceeds of taxation are distributed, which 
feeds back to affect the political support for higher taxes.
Low Contestability of Power
While one should be wary of generalizations, political control by a wealthy 
elite is a fact in many low-income countries. These elites are protected by a variety 
of institutional mechanisms, including hereditary successions of power, military 
governments, and elite control of political parties. With such incumbent groups, 
policy will tend to cater to those with above-median incomes, reducing the motive 
for progressive taxation. Control of government by elite groups will also affect the 
use to which revenues are put. If contests for power become more open, we would 
expect the demand for redistributive progressive taxation to increase, as suggested 
by the Meltzer–Richards (1981) framework and the empirical evidence in Husted 
and Kenny (1997). According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), historical reforms 
to widen the voting franchise often reflected the fears of rich ruling elites that they 
would otherwise bear the economic cost of revolution.
The benchmark Meltzer–Richards (1981) model assumes that the proceeds of 
taxation are equally shared. However, redistribution can be selective in many ways. 
For example, spending on tertiary education tends to favor elites and their families, 
while basic health services are more likely to help the poor. To the extent that rich 
114     Journal of Economic Perspectives
ruling elites prefer private alternatives, the demand for using the fiscal system to 
redistribute is diminished. In those circumstances, we expect elite control to favor 
less public spending.
Weak Checks and Balances
Checks and balances on incumbent groups can help create a preference for 
more common-interest spending. A strong legislature will often find the need to 
generate broad-based coalitions, which can offset the narrow focus of the execu-
tive. An independent judiciary can also promote broad-based access to public 
services through statutory-service obligations or rights-based arguments and 
rulings. However, many low-income countries have contests for power that are 
highly restricted, with limits on who can vote as well as who can run for office. 
Low-income countries also tend to have weaker checks and balances on the execu-
tive. For example, according to the often-used Polity IV database, only 7 percent of 
the countries with the lowest one-third of per capita GDP had the strongest score 
(on a scale from 1 to 7) for the extent to which political institutions imposed execu-
tive constraints in 2000, compared to around 40 percent amongst countries ranked 
in the upper two-thirds by per capita GDP.
Whatever benefit–cost case economists can make for investing in broad-based 
spending programs like infrastructure, health, and education, in many low-income 
countries there is little problem identifying the need for such public programs; 
the problem comes in delivering them. Problems of service delivery reflect the 
twin problems of inefficiency and corruption. The broad macro fact is that coun-
tries with strong executive constraints at the national level tend to have lower 
levels of corruption. Of course, such correlations may not have a fully persuasive 
causal interpretation, but the logic supporting them is straightforward. Checks 
and balances should provide a stronger basis for scrutinizing public spending 
decisions and initiating systems of auditing that are essential for eliminating 
corruption. Therefore, it is perhaps not so surprising to find a strong positive 
correlation between less corruption and the level of taxation, as already shown in 
Table 1 and as further illustrated in Figure 8 (keep in mind, a higher Corruption 
Perception Index corresponds to less perceived corruption). This correlation is 
partly due to the fact that corrupt systems of government are likely to face greater 
resistance to increasing the power to tax. However, it also reflects the common 
determinants of state effectiveness in multiple dimensions—what, in Besley and 
Person (2011), we refer to as development clusters. Different capacities of the state 
coevolve both because state competence increases in general and because of 
common underlying determinants, including institutions.
A growing number of microeconomic studies have looked at whether stronger 
monitoring may reduce corruption and improve service delivery in low-income 
countries. The results are mixed. Among these studies, Olken (2007) presents 
evidence from a randomized field experiment on approaches to reducing corrup-
tion in more than 600  road projects in Indonesia with systematic discrepancies 
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between official project costs and cost estimates by independent engineers. In this 
context, community monitoring does not appear effective. However, Reinikka and 
Svensson (2005) study a newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing capture 
of public funds by providing parents with the information needed to monitor how 
local officials’ allocated education grants. This study finds a significant improve-
ment in student enrollment and learning outcomes with community monitoring. 
These kinds of micro studies suggest country details and specific methods matter 
for the fight against corruption.
Less “leakage” in public spending programs is unlikely to be popular 
among the beneficiaries of corruption, especially rent-seeking bureaucrats and 
public-service providers. Some citizens may also benefit from the privileged access 
to public services that corruption can bring. Although such beneficiaries are 
likely to be a minority, they will lobby against corruption-reducing reforms. With 
pervasive corruption, the average citizen may be less inclined to support higher 
taxation and to comply with those taxes already in place. The next section turns 
to the cultures and norms that support a willingness to cooperate with taxation.
Figure 8 
Corruption and Fiscal Capacity
Note and Source: We use Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, according to 
which 0 indicates high perceived corruption and 10 indicates low perceived corruption. Share of taxes in 
GDP is from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005).
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Culture, Norms, and Identity
Intrinsic motives to pay taxes and to follow the law are also important deter-
minants for tax compliance, in addition to the material costs and benefits of tax 
compliance emphasized by economists since the seminal paper by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972). A variety of authors in different social sciences have discussed the 
ethics of tax-paying in various terms: for example, Gordon (1989) refers to indi-
vidual morality, Cowell (1990) to stigma, Erard and Feinstein (1994) to feelings 
of guilt and shame, Posner (2000) to tax-compliance norms, and Torgler (2007) 
to tax morale. (In this symposium, the paper by Luttmer and Singhal focuses on 
these tax-morale issues.) What unites these approaches is an argument that creating 
a culture of compliance may be central to raising revenue. Thus, one reason 
why low-income countries have lower levels of taxation may be a weaker ethic of 
tax-paying than the one that has evolved in high-income countries. The absence of 
a strong compliance norm means that any given statutory level of taxation will raise 
less revenue than would otherwise be expected.
However, there is little consensus on these ideas and their empirical importance, 
especially in the context of low-income countries. For example, high corruption or 
the perception that a tax system is unfair may hinder the emergence of a norm of 
compliance—but then the underlying problem is the corruption and unfairness, 
not the social norm as such. One interesting implication is that norms can intro-
duce strategic complementarities in individual compliance decisions as they become 
established. There could even be tipping points in compliance if the emergence of a 
norm depends on believing that paying taxes is a virtuous act. Such multiplier effects 
may result in big returns to investments in an improved legal code, greater impor-
tance of formal firms, tax monitoring, property registries, and the like.
But to evaluate such possibilities properly requires more research on the interac-
tions between individual material motives and social motives for paying taxes, which 
have so far been studied separately almost without exception. To make empirical 
progress on the importance of social norms for tax compliance also requires devel-
oping models with clear predictions—especially on interactions between individual 
and social motives to pay taxes—that can be taken to the data.
Benabou and Tirole (2011) provide a useful starting point by providing a 
general model where social motives tied to norms—emanating from a desire to 
acquire a social reputation—can alternatively strengthen (crowd in) or weaken 
(crowd out) stronger individual motives tied to laws. In Besley, Jensen, and Persson 
(2014), we consider a dynamic extension of that model and apply it empirically to 
compliance with local property taxes in the United Kingdom. Exploiting natural 
experiments both at the aggregate and local levels, we find evidence for consider-
able persistence in the social norms for tax compliance, as well as for significant 
interactions between individual incentives and social norms.
Tax-compliance norms may also emerge in part from a strengthened sense of 
national identity. Many weak states also exhibit a weak sense of national identity 
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among their citizens. This is one way of understanding the classic Hintze (1906) and 
Tilly (1990) argument linking war and taxation discussed above. It is also consistent 
with a positive correlation in the data between tax revenue and years spent in war. 
Figure 1 also showed a marked increase in taxation around the time of the two world 
wars that was not reversed after the war. In some countries, it has been argued that 
conducting war has been a source of common interests, both in terms of persuading 
citizens of the need for higher taxation and in establishing a norm of taxpaying 
(for example, Feldman and Slemrod 2009). If norms of tax compliance are indeed 
persistent, the revenue effects may last long after the war has ended. The patterns 
in Figure 1 suggest a persistent rather than a transitory effect of the two world wars.
A similar argument also applies to the negative correlation between ethnic frac-
tionalization and tax revenue. This mirrors the well-known argument that country 
borders contrived by colonial powers in Africa created ethnically fragmented poli-
ties with detrimental developmental consequences (for example, Easterly and 
Levine 1997). But fragmentation is unlikely to be given and immutable, so the ques-
tion relevant for policy is what factors might alter ethnic identification over time. 
As Bates (1974) argued, the creation of independent post-colonial states in Africa 
drove stronger identification with pre-existing ethnic groups to compete for the 
spoils of state patronage. When ethnic tensions are strong enough to promote civil 
war, such war—in contrast to wars between nation states—could increase animosity 
between groups and reduce national identity.
State Building
For low-income countries, extending the scope for taxation is a dynamic process 
that requires forward-looking investments in institutions. Governments make decisions 
about what tax bases to operate and what administrative and compliance structures 
to put in place. One good example is the decision to introduce direct withholding 
from pay, which is central to broad-based income taxation (as  illustrated earlier in 
Figure 1). Another good example would be the resources spent on organization and 
training in tax authorities. Because these choices have long-term consequences, in 
Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), we refer to them as fiscal-capacity investments.
In this dynamic view, current decisions to introduce or modify tax systems 
affect the level of taxation in the future. An investment that reduces the leakage 
from income taxes due to base-broadening will both yield higher tax revenue in the 
future and change the incentives for future governments to raise revenues from 
the income tax. This insight suggests that one can think of investments in fiscal 
capacity as (partly) strategic and forward looking.
Taxation and Weak States
Taxation has played a central role in the development of states. Throughout 
history, struggles over revenue have been at the heart of state power. One of the 
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founding documents of modern constitutional governments, the 1215 Magna Carta 
in England, had the authority to raise tax at its very core. It enabled the state of 
that time to move towards a centralized system of tax setting, in which Parliament 
had a role. Historical accounts of development of the fiscal state in France (such 
as Dincecco 2011) argue that centralization of tax-setting power was a more recent 
phenomenon. On this view, taxation is a key aspect of the coercive power of the 
state. As such, it is intimately linked to establishing law and order within a territory.
States that fail to raise significant revenues in GDP also commonly fail to 
protect property rights effectively (as illustrated earlier in Table 1). Taxation is a 
rule-based form of revenue extraction that suits a market economy. Market relations 
become the base of revenue generation. Hence, any government that desires to tax 
will also have an incentive to build those institutions that support formal markets. 
For example, building a formal financial system will create the basis for more effec-
tive taxation of firms and individuals. Because the establishment of the rule of law 
helps improve the functioning of markets, the building of fiscal capacity is tied in a 
complementary way to building state effectiveness along other dimensions.
In the end, taxation is therefore not just about building the coercive power of 
the state but changing the way in which that coercion is channeled. Expropriation 
and other more damaging forms of extraction by the state are replaced by the more 
benign case of rules-based taxation.
But the tax/GDP ratio in modern high-income countries is high for reasons 
that go beyond coercion. In these countries, government faces a number of legal 
and practical constraints—including a real possibility of being voted out of office. 
Economic institutions, political institutions, and social and cultural norms have all 
evolved in a way that supports a broad tax base and a reasonable degree of tax 
compliance. The demand for accountable and transparent government is fueled 
by citizens who are aware of the need to ensure that tax revenues are wisely spent.
For modern low-income countries, the problem of raising more tax reve-
nues is ultimately a wider issue than having the right kind of technical expertise. 
Government institutions and tax systems evolve together, and taxation may feed 
back to the development of political systems (as argued for example, by Levi 
1988). Weak and unaccountable states are unlikely to have strong motives to build 
fiscal capacity, and their citizens are unlikely to evolve strong norms of compli-
ance. This is a classic problem of positive feedbacks, which can yield good and bad 
equilibrium paths.
What Sequence for State-Building
Many organizations offer technical assistance to countries that wish to improve 
the operation of their tax authorities. Some aspects of policy may soon be informed 
by evidence based on randomized interventions. For example, Khan, Khwaja, 
and Olken (2014) work with the property-tax department in Punjab, Pakistan, to 
assign property-tax units into one of three performance-pay schemes or a control 
group. They find that incentivized units display average revenue growth 9 percent 
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higher than the control group. As with much evidence generated from randomized 
control trials, a key issue is whether governments are willing to change in the wake 
of empirical evidence.
Ultimately the most striking observation is the basic fact, stressed at the begin-
ning of this paper, that developing countries today are not so different—in terms 
of the tax share in GDP, and the structure of taxation—from modern high-income 
countries at a similar stage of development. This pattern suggests that low taxation 
may reflect a range of factors that also help to explain why low-taxing countries 
are poor. From this perspective, the most important challenge is taking steps that 
encourage development, rather than special measures focused exclusively on 
improving the tax system.
References
Acemoglu Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. 
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
Cambridge University Press.
Allingham, Michael G., and Agnar Sandmo. 
1972. “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Anal-
ysis.” Journal of Public Economics 1(3–4): 323–38.
Bates, Robert H. 1974. “Ethnic Competition 
and Modernization in Contemporary Africa.” 
Comparative Political Studies 6(4): 457–84.
Baunsgaard, Thomas, and Michael Keen. 2005. 
“Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization.” 
Mimeo, IMF.
Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2011. “Laws 
and Norms.” NBER Working Paper 17579.
Besley, Timothy, Anders Jensen, and Torsten 
Persson. 2014. “Norms, Enforcement and Tax 
Evasion.” http://people.su.se/~tpers/papers 
/Draft_140302.pdf.
Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2009. 
“The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, 
Taxation, and Policy.” American Economic Review 
99(4): 1218–44.
Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2011. 
Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Develop-
ment Clusters. Princeton University Press.
Bräutigam, Deborah A., Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 
and Mick Moore, eds. 2008. Taxation and State-
Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and 
Consent. Cambridge University Press.
Cowell, Frank Alan. 1990. Cheating the 
Government: The Economics of Evasion. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Dincecco, Mark. 2011. Political Transformations 
and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913. Cambridge 
University Press.
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 1997. 
“Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 
1203–50.
Erard, Brian, and Jonathan Feinstein. 1994. 
“The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit 
Perceptions on Tax Compliance.” Public Finance 
49(Special Issue on Public Finance and Irregular 
Activities): 70–89.
Fearon, James D. 2003. “Ethnic and Cultural 
Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 
8(2): 195–222.
Feldman, Naomi E., and Joel Slemrod. 2009. 
“War and Taxation: When Does Patriotism Over-
come the Free-Rider Impulse?” Chap. 8 in The 
New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective, edited by I. W. Martin, A. K. 
Mehrotra, and M. Prasad. Cambridge University 
Press.
Gordon, James P. F. 1989. “Individual Morality 
and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion.” 
European Economic Review 33(4): 797–804.
Gordon, Roger, and Young Lee. 2005. “Tax 
Structure and Economic Growth.” Journal of Public 
Economics 89(5–6): 1027–43.
120     Journal of Economic Perspectives
Hintze, Otto. 1906. “Military Organization 
and the Organization of the State.” (Reprinted 
in 1970 as chap. 5 in The Historical Essays of Otto 
Hintze, edited by Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford 
University Press.)
Husted, Thomas A., and Lawrence W. Kenny. 
1997. “The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting 
Franchise on the Size of Government.” Journal of 
Political Economy 105(1): 54–81.
Jensen, Anders. 2011. “State-Building in 
Resource-Rich Economies.” Atlantic Journal of 
Economics 39(2): 171–93.
Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin 
A. Olken. 2014. “Tax Farming Redux: Experimental 
Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors.” 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/9646.
Kleven, Henrik, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, 
and Emmanuel Saez. 2009. “Why Can Modern 
Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of 
Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries.” NBER Working 
Paper 15218.
La Porta, Rafael, and Andrei Shleifer. 2014. 
“Informality and Development.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 28(3): 109–26.
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: 
A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Mitchell, Brian R. 2007. International Historical 
Statistics: Volume 1: Africa, Asia and Oceania 
1750–2005; Volume 2: The Americas, 1750–2005; 
Volume 3: Europe, 1750–2005, Palgrave Macmillan.
Meltzer, Alan, and Scott Richards. 1981. 
“A  Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” 
Journal of Political Economy 89(5): 914–27.
Olken, Benjamin A. 2007. “Monitoring 
Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment 
in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 115(2): 
200–249.
Olken, Benjamin A. and Monica Singhal. 2011. 
“Informal Taxation.” American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics 3(4): 1–28.
Piketty, Thomas, and Nancy Qian. 2009. 
“Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxa-
tion in China and India, 1986–2015.” American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(2): 53–63.
Posner, Eric A. 2000. “Law and Social Norms: 
The Case of Tax Compliance.” Virginia Law Review 
86(8, Symposium on the Legal Construction of 
Norms): 1781–1819.
Reinikka, Ritva, and Jakob Svensson. 2005. 
“Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: 
Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in 
Uganda.” Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion 3(2–3): 259–67.
Roberts, Kevin W. S. 1977. “Voting over Income 
Tax Schedules.” Journal of Public Economics 8(3): 
329–40.
Romer, Thomas. 1975. “Individual Welfare, 
Majority Voting and the Properties of the Linear 
Income Tax.” Journal of Public Economics 4(2): 
163–68.
Schneider, Friedrich. 2002. “Size and Measure-
ment of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries 
around the World.” Unpublished paper.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1918. “The Crisis of the 
Tax State.” In International Economic Papers, vol. 4, 
pp. 5–38.
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How 
Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. Yale University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and 
European States, AD 990–1992. Oxford: Blackwell.
Torgler, Benno. 2007. Tax Morale and Tax 
Compliance: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
World Bank. 2012. China 2030: Building 
a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
